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Remarks

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Executive Secretary

10 Oct 86
Date

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

10 October 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting DDS&T

FROM: DCI

Thanks for your valuable thoughts
on the IC Staff.

William J. Casey

cc: DDCI

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8 October 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: James V. Hirsch
                 Acting Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT: Restructuring the ICS

1. I understand you are interested in ideas on changing the Intelligence
Community Staff (ICS). I offer the following unsolicited comments on the sub-
ject based on having spent some time on the Staff in the Collection Evaluation
Office in 1977-1978 and having interacted with the Staff at various levels
since its inception.

2. What should the ICS do?

— The ICS should stand in relation to you as a corporate staff does
to the CEO of a major corporation. The strength of the Community resides
in its program managers who are responsible for implementation of your
plans and policies. So the principal work of the Staff should be to pro-
vide a common basis for activities across the Community and to integrate
related Community programs. The ICS could serve well by organizing around
three tasks:

- Requirements — Analysis of intelligence needs in relation to
our current state of knowledge and to our planned collection,
processing and analysis capabilities is a prerequisite to an
integrated intelligence effort. The transformation of those needs
into collection requirements across the board is also something that
can be objectively done by a corporate staff. The ICS could
profitably model, in some detail, our state of knowledge on strategic
intelligence problems, identify gaps, and prioritize collection
requirements.

- Programs — We must do better at integrating Community
programs into a coherent whole and assessing overall performance.

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SUBJECT: Restructuring the ICS

This function is potentially the most contentious of the Staff's responsibilities. In the past, the effort has been competitive with those of the program managers. That is the wrong way to do it. The ICS should adopt the posture of honest brokers of your program managers' contributions to the NFIP, using their data and definition of systems capabilities as a point of departure.

- Budget -- The budget is the place that your plans and objectives are truly defined, separate strategic plans and policies notwithstanding. One of our major management problems is the disconnect between strategic plans and program implementation. The ICS would do well not only to put together a Community budget, but also to assure the budget directly serves your strategic plans and policies.

3. What's wrong with the ICS?

-- The functions important to focusing intelligence activities on priority needs and to integrating plans, programs and budgets across the Community are diluted by units within the Staff that are not in step with your program managers' business. For example, several of the DIRNSA's apparently are of the opinion that the SIGINT Committee and its SORS are anachronistic, being more of hindrance than a help. Other examples of units whose missions need to be rethought and corresponding organizational adjustments made include COMIREX, HUMINT Committee, CIPC, Foreign Intelligence Priorities Committee, Plans and Programs Staff, and the Intelligence Producers Council. The concept of integrating Community activities through committees dates back to the 1950's and 1960's. It is an outmoded and cumbersome way of doing business today.

-- There are precious few top notch people serving on the ICS. We have not, in general, made good appointments there over the years. The notion of a permanent ICS cadre forced on us by the Congress in 1977-1978 does not help in this regard. Mistakes are difficult to correct and the critical mass of positions for realistic career development simply does not exist in a staff of some 220 people.

-- In many cases the ICS is in competition with program manager activities. The staff tends to operate at the wrong level and without suitable tools. For example, in the satellite business the ICS cannot compete with the sophisticated collection system simulation capabilities

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SUBJECT: Restructuring the ICS

of the National Reconnaissance Office, nor should they. Yet they tend to posture themselves to drive those activities rather than to take them as inputs to a higher level assessment function.

4. What might be done about it?

— Give General Heinz a CIA deputy more experienced in systems analysis, programming and budgeting.

-- Then turn the problem over to them with the following specifications which you will support:

- Restructure with focus on requirements, programs and budgets to include value added performance assessments and integration of purpose across the Community. Find the right level for ICS analysis and program integration work to satisfy your needs and not duplicate what your program managers do.

- Their solution must be realistic.

- There are no sacred cows in the ICS organization.

- Find good people in the Community for key jobs.

5. I would be happy to discuss or elaborate on the foregoing if you wish.

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James V. Hirsch

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